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An Improved ID-Based Group Key Agreement Protocol
Kangwen Hu, Jingfeng Xue, Changzhen Hu, Rui Ma, and Zhiqiang Li
Abstract: ID-based constant-round group key agreement protocols are efficient in both computation and
communication, but previous protocols did not provide valid message authentication. An improvement based on
attack analysis is proposed in this paper. The improved method takes full advantage of the data transmitted at
various stages of the protocol. By guaranteeing the freshness of authentication messages, the authenticity of the
generator of authentication messages, and the completeness of the authenticator, the improved protocol can resist
various passive and active attacks. The forward secrecy of the improved protocol is proved under a Katz-Yung (KY)
model. Compared with existing methods, the improved protocol is more effective and applicable.
Key words: group key agreement protocol; ID; forward secrecy; nonsuper-singular elliptic curve

1

Introduction

The Identity-Based Cryptosystem (IBC) proposed by
Shamir in 1984 is simpler than the PKI/CA that
is currently widely used in key management[1] . In
2000, Joux proposed a tripartite key agreement with
one round of communication using both Weil and
Tate pairing[2] . Now, group key agreement protocols
based on bilinear pairings of identity have elicited
a lot of research. In 2002, Reddy first proposed an
IDentity-based Authenti-cated Group Key Agreement
(ID-AGKA) protocol with HOFT[3] . This protocol used
Weil pairing, and provided implicit key authentication
attribute; however, it just analyzed security attributes
did not give rigorous proof. In 2003, Du et al. proposed
a constant-round group key agreement protocol based
on Burmester-Desmedt (BD) structure[4, 5] . In 2004,
Choi et al.[6] proposed a similar ID-AGKA and
proved its security; it is efficient on both computation
and communication but, because of a lack of entity
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authentication, it cannot resist internal impersonation or
external attacks[7-9] . Many researchers have put forward
a series of ways to improve Choi’s ID-AGKA[8-13] . In
this paper, a series of ID-AGKAs, represented by Choi’s
protocol, are analyzed and a new, improved scheme
is proposed. This scheme can resist known internal
impersonation attacks as well as external attacks.

2

Choi’s ID-AGKA Protocol

In this section, we will briefly introduce the Choi’s
protocol; its detailed description is in Ref. [6].
Through the paper, we assume that G1 is a cyclic
additive group of big prime order q and G2 is a cyclic
multiplicative group of the same order q. P is G1 ’s
generator. The discrete logarithm problem is intractable
in both G1 and G2 . eW G1  G1 ! G2 is a valid bilinear
map and satisfies the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman
problem (DBDH) assumption[14] . H W f0; 1g ! Zq
and H1 W f0; 1g ! G1 are two hash functions. In the
security proof, H and H1 are treated as random oracles.
Setup: The private Key Generation Center (KGC)
randomly chooses a number s 2 Zq as its master
secret key, chooses G1 ’s generator P , computes Ppub D
sP , and publishes system parameters params D
fe; G1 ; G2 ; q; P; Ppub ; H; H1 g.
Extract: The user UID with the identity of the ID
sends the ID to the KGC. The KGC computes the
public key QID D H1 .ID/ and the private key SID D
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sQID . Then the KGC sends the SID to UID by a secure
channel.
A group of users fU1 ; U2 ;    ; Un g want to establish a
session key. U1 ; U2 ;    ; Un form a ring. For 1 6 i 6 n,
Ui 1 and Ui C1 are the left and right users of Ui , U0 D
Un , and UnC1 D U1 . hQi ; Si i are the public and private
key pair of Ui .
Round 1: The Ui randomly chooses ai 2 Zq as its
secret key and computes Pi D ai P , hi D H.Pi /, and
Ti D ai Ppub C hi Si . Then the Ui keeps ai secret and
broadcasts hPi ; Ti i.
Round 2:
After Ui receives hPi 1 ; Ti 1 i,
hPi C1 ; Ti C1 i, and hPi C2 ; Ti C2 i, it will check whether
they meet the following equation:
0
1
X
e@
Ti Ck ; P A D
k2f 1;1;2g

0
e@

1
X

.Pi Ck C hi Ck Qi Ck /; Ppub A :

k2f 1;1;2g

If the above equation is not true, Ui will stop running
the protocol and broadcast “failure”. Otherwise, Ui will
compute Di D e.ai .PiC2 Pi 1 /; Pi C1 / and broadcast
Di to the other members of the group.
Key computation: Ui computes its session key by
the formula:
n n 1 n 2
Di C1
1 Pi C1 / Di

Ki D e.ai Pi

a1 a2 a3 CCan

e.P; P /

3

   Di

1 an a1 Can a1 a2

2

D

:

Attacks on the Protocol

There are mainly four types of attacks on the Choi’s
protocol[6] and its variants[4, 15] .
(1) Replay impersonation attacks by malicious
neighbors. Zhang and Chen[7] pointed out that
Ui 1 and Ui 2 , two malicious neighbors of
Ui , may collude to replay hPi ; Ti i, which is
Ui ’s authentication message in group GA . The
attackers can impersonate Ui in a new group, GB ,
without being noticed.
(2) Impersonation
attacks
by
colluding
[8]
verifiers. Shim
pointed out that if Ui 2 ,
Ui 1 , and Ui C1 (Ui ’s three malicious neighbors)
collude, they can impersonate Ui without
replaying hPi ; Ti i in a new group with randomly
chosen ai and Di .
(3) External attacks that lead to group members
computing different session keys. Li and He[9-11]

pointed out that adversaries may divide the group
into two subgroups and transmit different data to
each. Thus, these two subgroups will get different
session keys which means the protocol is broken.
(4) Passive attacks that compute session keys simply
by monitoring transcripts. Li[10] pointed out that
the protocol proposed by Liu and Xu[15] cannot
resist the three attacks mentioned above and,
according to the nature of bilinear pairings, as
long as communication in the group is monitored,
the attackers can compute session keys.
In fact, we find that as long as the adversary can
pass verification in Round 1, it can break the protocol
successfully. So these series of protocols[4, 6, 15] will not
be able to resist man-in-the-middle attacks. If adversary
A can control all transmitted/received data of U1 ,
and it can save data transmitted by U1 in a normal
agreement at sometime denoted by hP10 ; T10 ; D10 i. When
U1 is involved in a new agreement, adversary A
can launch attacks as follows: U1 will transmit
hP1 ; T1 i according to the protocol in Round 1, A
intercepts hP1 ; T1 i of U1 , broadcasts hP10 ; T10 i to the
other members of the group and forwards hPi ; Ti i
that transmitted by the other nodes to U1 . In Round
2, A replays Di to the other members of the group
and forwards Di from the other nodes to U1 . After
the agreement, the session key shared by A and
U1 is K1 D e.P; P /a1 a2 a3 CCan 1 an a1 Can a1 a2 ; the
session key shared by A and the other users is
0
K10 D e.P; P /a1 a2 a3 CCan 1 an a1 Can a1 a2 . Thus, A
can decrypt data that encrypted by any session keys of
the two subgroups.
In summary, there are three reasons why
impersonation attacks and external attacks work:
(1) The protocol does not authenticate the Di in
Round 2.
(2) The authenticators of hPi ; Ti i are Ui ’s neighbors
only.
(3) The authentication data associates with
protocol’s current execution status little.
The reason for the success of passive attacks is that
the temporary secret key is not used correctly in the
session key formula.
Therefore, protocol improvement should be focused
on the freshness of the authentication messages, the
authenticity of the generator of the authentication
messages, and the completeness of the authenticators.
(1) Pi broadcasted by each user in Round 1 can
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identify current run of protocol, we can integrate
all Pi values into the signature computation to
ensure its freshness.
(2) The signature must be generated by a longterm private key to ensure the authenticity of the
entities being authenticated.
(3) All users in the group must contribute to
authentication information to ensure the
completeness of the authenticators.
In addition, we should minimize unnecessary
computations and messages for efficiency.

4
4.1

Improvement of the Protocol and Analysis
Improvement of the protocol

Setup:
System parameters and the protocol
initialization are the same as the original protocol.
Round 1: Each user Ui randomly chooses ai 2 Zq ,
computes Pi D ai P , broadcasts Pi to others and keeps
ai secret.
Round 2: Upon the receipt of all data broadcasted
by other members of the group, user Ui computes
Di D e.ai .Pi C1 Pi 1 /; Ppub /, Ti D ai Ppub C hi Si ;
where hi D H.Di kPID kSID /, PID D P1 k    kPn , and
SID D ID1 k    kIDn . Then, it broadcasts hDi ; Ti i to
other members of the group.
Key computation: The user Ui checks whether
e.Tj ; P / D e.Pj C hj Qj ; Ppub /, (1 6 j 6 n and
j ¤ i ) is true. If not, Ui aborts and broadcasts
“failure”. Otherwise, Ui computes session key Ki :
Ki D e.ai Pi

n n 1 n 2
Di C1
1 ; Ppub / Di

   Di

.a1 a2 Ca2 a3 CCan a1 /s

2

D

e.P; P /
:
The authentication mechanism
of the protocol is
similar to Hess’s signature scheme. The definition is as
follows.
Signature generation: Given a secret key, compute
Si D sH1 .IDi /, then T D aPpub C hSi ; where
a 2R Zq , h D H.Di kPID kSID /, and haP; T i
gen .SID /.
Signature verification: Given public key QID and
signature hDi ; Ti i, check whether e.T; P / D e.aP C
hQID ; Ppub / is true, where h D H.Di kPID kSID /;
True or False
ver .QID ; haP; T i/.
The batch validation reduces the number of
calculations of bilinear pairings and improves
verification efficiency[13] . Our improvement is similar
to those in Refs. [4, 6, 16]. According to the nature and

423

symmetry of bilinear pairings,

n
Y

Di D 1 is true. After

i D1

each user receives all Di , they should check Di by this
formula.
4.2

Proof of security

This
protocol
transmits
messages
through
broadcasting. All participants (including the adversary
who controls the network) will receive the same
message. The KY model satisfies this feature[17] . The
security definitions can be found in Refs. [6, 17]. To
prove this protocol, we measure indistinguishability
by the hybrid argument method[18] . We name this
improved protocol IB-AGKA and will prove that it still
provides forward secrecy.
Theorem 1 After the active rival issues qex Execute
inquiries and qs Send inquiries within time t , we define
AdvID-AGKA-fs
IB-AGKA .t; qex ; qs / as the maximum advantage of
the attacker. We define Forger as a Probabilistic
Polynomial Time (PPT) forger of authentication
scheme
under the adaptively chosen ID attack, and
ID
Forger as a PPT forger of
under given ID attack.
We take hash functions H and H1 as random oracles.
AdvID-AGKA-fs
IB-AGKA .t; qex ; qs / 6
Forge

2n.qex C qs /AdvDBDH
G1 ;G2 ;e .t / C Adv
Forge

.t /:

Here, Adv
.t / is the maximum advantage of any
forger Forger running in time t.
Proof Let A be an active attacker, who can get
advantage in attacking the protocol in two ways:
(1) Forging an authentication message or
impersonating a user.
(2) Breaking the protocol without modifying any
message.
Assuming that Adversary A breaks IB-AGKA by
adaptive impersonation attack, we can construct a
forger Forger C of an authentication scheme
by
A. This forger can produce a valid ternary hUi ; Di ; Ti i
of authentication scheme in the following ways.
Forger C honestly generates the public/private key
pair of all other users except Ui . C simulates the oracle
inquiries of adversary A in the natural way; this results
in a perfect simulation unless A issues Corrupt.Ui /,
in which case, C aborts. If A produces a new valid
hUi ; Di ; Ti i, we denote this event by Forge and make
A pass the result to C . Thus, we believe that C is
a successful forger of authentication scheme . So
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the probability of C ’s success meets PrA ŒForge 6
Forge
Forge
AdvC; .t/ 6 Adv
.t /.
Next, we assume that A can also break IB-AGKA
without altering transcripts; thus, we can use IB-AGKA
to solve the MDBDH problem. According to Ref. [6],
MDBDH and DBDH are computationally equivalent,
DBDH
namely, AdvMDBDH
G1 ;G2 ;e .t / D AdvG1 ;G2 ;e .t /. We first
consider the case that A issues only a single Execute
query Execute.ID1 ;    ; IDn / and then extend this to
multiple Execute queries. Let n be the number of users
selected by A; the distribution of transcripts T and the
group session key K are give by:
3
2
.G1 ; G2 ; e/
IGBDH .1k /I P
G1 I
7
6
7
6
s
Zq I Ppub D sP
7;
6
Params D 6
7
Q
;



;
Q
G
I
S
D
sQ
;



;
1
n
1
1
1
5
4
sn D sQn W .G1 ; G2 ; e; P; Ppub /
3
2
a1 ;    ; an ; h1 ;    ; hn
Zq I
7
6
7
6
P1 D a1 P;    ; Pn D an P I
7
6
7
6
T1 D a1 Ppub C h1 S1 ;    ;
7
6
7
6
7
6
Tn D an Ppub C hn Sn I
7
6
def 6
7
e.a
P
;
P
/
e.a
P
;
P
/
2
3
pub
1
2
pub
Real D 6 D1 D
:
; D2 D
; 7
6
e.a1 Pn ; Ppub /
e.a2 P1 ; Ppub / 7
7
6
7
6
e.an P1 ; Ppub /
7
6
   ; Dn D
7
6
e.an Pn 1 ; Ppub /
7
6
6 T DhP ;   ; P ; T ;   ; T ; D ;   ; D i 7
1
n
1
n
1
n
5
4
n n 1
KDe.a1 Pn ;Ppub / D1    Dn 1 W.T; K/
where IGBDH is a PPT algorithm that takes a security
parameter 1k , runs in polynomial time, and outputs two
groups G1 and G2 of the same order q and an reasonable
bilinear map e: G1  G2 ! G2:
Now we construct a serial of mixed distributions,
Fakei .i D 1;    ; n/ which is defined as follows:
3
2
rs;n;1 ; a1 ;    ; an ; h1 ;    ; hn
Zq I
7
6
7
6
P1 D a1 P;    ; Pn D an P I
7
6
7
6
T1 D a1 Ppub C h1 S1 ;    ;
7
6
7
6
7
6
Tn D an Ppub C hn Sn I
7
6
def6
7
e.a
P
;
P
/
e.a
P
;
P
/
2 3
pub
1 2
pub
Fakei D6 D1 D
:
; D2 D
; 7
7
6
e.r
P;
P
/
e.a
P
;
P
/
s;n;1
2 1
pub
7
6
7
6
e.rs;n;1 P; P /
7
6
   ; Dn D
7
6
e.an Pn 1 ; Ppub /
7
6
6 T DhP ;   ; P ; T ;   ; T ; D ;   ; D iI 7
1
n
1
n
1
n
5
4
n n 1
KDe.rs;n;1 P;Ppub / D1   Dn 1W.T;K/
According to this construction method, we can obtain
the distribution:

2

3
rs;n;1 ;    ; rs;n 1;n ; a1 ;    ; an ; h1 ;    ;
6
7
Zq I P1 D a1 P;    ; Pn D an P I 7
6 hn
6
7
6
7
T
D
a
P
C
h
S
;



;
1
1
pub
1
1
6
7
6
7
Tn D an Ppub C hn Sn I
6
7
6
e.rs;1;2 P;Ppub /
e.rs;2;3 P;Ppub / 7
def
Faken D 6
; D2D
; 7:
6 D1De.r
e.rs;1;2 P;Ppub / 7
6
7
s;n;1 P;Ppub /
6
7
e.rs;n;1 P; Ppub /
6
7
   ; Dn D
6
7
e.rs;n 1;n P; Ppub /
6
7
6
7
T
DhP
;


;
P
;
T
;


;
T
;
D
;


;
D
i
4
5
1
n
1
n
1
n
KDe.rs;n;1 P;Ppub /n D1n 1   Dn 1 W.T;K/
Adversary A can obtain all long-term secret keys
Si and hash values h1 (i D 1;    ; n) through multiple
Corrupt and H inquiries; compute ai Ppub D Ti
hSi D sai P (since Ppub D sP is a global parameter,
and Pi D ai P can be obtained from transcripts). Let
".t / D AdvMDBDH
G1 ;G2 ;e .t /, according to the MDBDH
assumption; any distinguishing algorithms A running in
time t can result:
j PrŒ.T; K/
Real W A.T; K/ D 1 PrŒ.T; K/
Fake1 W A.T; K/ D 1j 6 ".t /:
The reason is that adversary A has to distinguish
e.P; P /sa1 an from e.P; P /rs ;n;1 , which satisies
MDBDH.
Similarity:
j PrŒ.T; K/
Fake1 W A.T; K/ D 1 PrŒ.T; K/
Fake2 W A.T; K/ D 1j 6 ".t /;
::
:
j PrŒ.T; K/

Faken 1 W A.T; K/ D 1 PrŒ.T; K/
Faken W A.T; K/ D 1j 6 ".t /:

Let e.P; P / D g 2 G2 . In experiment Faken , the
value rs;1;2 ;    ; rs;n;1 are constrained by T according
to the following n equations:
8
ˆ logg D1 D rs;1;2 rs;n;1 ;
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
< log D2 D rs;2;3 rs;1;2 ;
g
::
ˆ
:
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
: log D D r
r
:
g

n

s;n;1

s;n 1;n

The coefficient matrix of the equation set is
2
3
1
0  
1
6
7
0  0 7
6 1 0
6
7:
::
6
7
:
4
5
0  
1 1
Its rank is n 1; n 1 vectors are linearly
independent. In distribution Faken , KFaken D
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e.P; P /rs;1;2 Crs;2;3 CCrs;n;1 . If both sides of the
equation are logarithmic, we get logg KFaken D rs;1;2 C
rs;2;3 C    C rs;n;1 . Obviously, it is independent of
T . This indicates that for any adversary A, the equation
is true:
PrŒ.T; K/
Faken W A.T; K/ D 1 D
PrŒT

Faken ; K

Random:A.T; K/ D 1:

This means that adversary A cannot distinguish session
key KFaken from a random number of the same length
by distribution Faken .
Similarly, under MDBDH assumption, any algorithm
A running in time t, we can get:
j PrŒT
Faken I K
Faken W A.T; K/ D 1
PrŒT
Faken 1 I K
Random:A.T; K/ D 1j 6 ".t /;
::
:
j PrŒT
Fake1 I K
Random:A.T; K/ D 1
PrŒT
Real;K
Random:A.T; K/ D 1j 6 ".t /:
According to the above equations, we can get:
j PrŒT
RealI K
RealW A.T; K/ D 1
PrŒT RealI K RandomW A.T; K/D1j62n".t /:
This means, when the adversary A intercepts all
transcripts of the subgroup he chooses, the advantage of
distinguishing real session key K from a random value
of the same length is 2n".t /.
DBDH
Because ".t/ D AdvMDBDH
G1 ;G2 ;e .t / D AdvG1 ;G2 ;e .t /,
DBDH
PrA Œ Forge 6 2nAdvG1 ;G2 ;e .t / is established.
In summary:
Forge
DBDH
AdvID-AGKA-fs
.t /:
IB-AGKA .t; 1/ 6 2nAdvG1 ;G2 ;e .t / C Adv
After issuing qS Send inquires and qE Execute
inquires, the result is:
AdvID-AGKA-fs
IB-AGKA .t; qE ; qS / 6
Forge

2n.qS C qE /AdvDBDH
G1 ;G2 ;e .t / C Adv
Detailed calculations regarding
advantage are in Refs. [6, 19].
4.3

the

.t /:
forger’s


Analysis of improvement

This improvement uses some of the ideas in Refs. [11,
13, 20]. In addition to its forward security, it can resist
all kinds of known attacks:
(1) Active attacks[7-10] : Ui ’s malicious neighbors
Ui 1 and Ui C1 save the message hPi0 ; Di0 ; Ti0 i,
which was transmitted in the old group GA by
Ui . They send Pi0 in Round 1 of the new group
GB , thus ai D ai0 . According to the protocol,
Ui 1 and Ui C1 in GB can get Pi broadcasted
by all users in the first round. If the collusion
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attackers want to pass verification in Round
2, they must construct the correct signature of
Di , which is Ti D ai Ppub C hi Si . Although the
attacker can compute hi D H.Di kPID kSID /, it
still needs to compute ai Ppub and obtain Ui ’s
long-term private key Si . Under the Elliptic
Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)
assumption and secure transmission of the private
key, neither can be obtained, i.e., the adversary
cannot calculate Ti . The malicious neighbors
cannot generate valid Ui signatures in new group,
and the protocol’s honest participants are able to
detect the attacks.
(2) Passive attacks[10] : The adversary can obtain
system parameters Pi , Ti , and Di . According
to Ki D e.ai Pi 1 ; Ppub /n Din 1 DinC12    Di 2 ,
the adversary knows that Pi D ai P , Ppub D sP ,
and Pi 1 D ai 1 P . Under the Computational
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (CBDHP)
problem assumption, the adversary cannot
compute e.ai Pi 1 ; Ppub / D e.P; P /sai 1 ai , so
they cannot get the session key.
In addition to the Internet, LAN, and other
common networks, these improvements also apply to
environments where the node’s calculation capability
is weak, the node’s buffer is small, and the channel
bandwidth is low—such as Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs). In this type of network, protocol data can be
transmitted in batches. In Round 1, Ui first unicasts Pi
to Ui 1 and Ui C1 and then broadcasts Pi to the other
nodes. After Ui receives Pi 1 and Pi C1 , it computes
Di and broadcasts it. Thus, although the Pi values of
the other nodes required in Round 2 for Ti calculation
are received relatively late, we can first calculate session
key K and verify Ti later. The improvement can avoid
channel congestion caused by all node’s simultaneous
broadcasting. Nodes need not wait for all data to arrive
and then calculate. The parallelism of system is best.
Regardless of whether Tate or Weil pairing
is used, when parameters P and Q are linearly
dependent, their safety is not guaranteed. We denote,

Q D kP (k 2R Zm
; P 2 EŒm), thus, we have
e.P; Q/ D e.P; kP / D e.P; P /k D 1 with Weil
pairing, according to its identity element and bilinear
nature[14] . Obviously, it must not occur in practice. In
Ref. [6], Choi made an admissive bilinear map that
satisfies e.P; P / ¤ 1, that may need extra work on
existing pairing. Although the hypersingular curve can
map two related points to different groups[14, 21-23] by
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distortion mapping, the nonhypersingular curve does
not have this property. In the original protocol[6] and
its improvement[9, 10, 13] , the two bilinear parameters
both belong to hP i; if some user’s temporary private
key is multiple of some other’s, then P and Q
are linearly dependent. In our protocol, the second
parameter of bilinear pairing is always Ppub . When we
configure the global parameters, we can set it outside
hP i, such as Ppub D sQ, Q 62 hP i. The session
key is K D e.P; Q/.a1 a2 Ca2 a3 CCan a1 /s . Under
the MDBDH assumption, the modification still holds
forward secrecy. Thus, our protocol can be implemented
by supersingular/nonsupersingular curves.
In addition, there are some other improvements to
resist existing attacks. Shim[8] proposed to use the
long-term private keys to sign Ti and Di , which can
resist the impersonation attacks mentioned in Refs. [7,
8]. However, Ref. [13] proposed that such long-term
private keys cannot resist replay attacks. Park proposed
that the user index can be randomized by KGC[12] ;
each user calculates Di by new index[7, 8] . This
improvement can resist impersonation attacks to
some extent, but relies too much on KGC, and
massive encryption/decryption operations make KGC a
bottleneck. Du et al.[25] proposed that all users maintain
a counter together, increase it by 1 when agreement
occurs, and participants use the product of the counter
and the original long-term private key as the new private
key to make every hPi ; Ti i different. Thus, users can
detect replayed authentication message in Round 1, but
system synchronization is heavy to maintain. Choi and
Li proposed to integrate protocol messages of current
run into the signature[10, 11, 13] , and this is by far the most
comprehensive method. However, Choi’s improvement
requires two signatures[13] ; in fact, the signature of
Round 2 also provides verification of messages in
Round 1.
Table 1 provides a comprehensive comparison of
several improvements. Our protocol does not need
either extra KGC assistance or a global counter, and
Table 1
Protocol

Rounds

Park and Choi[12]
Du et al.[25]
Choi[13]
Li and He[11]
This protocol

3
2
2
2
2

is compatible with non-supersingular curves. Compared
with other improved methods, our protocol applies
more widely.
Table 2 compares the amount of calculation
operations required of individual participants, including
point multiplication, point addition, hash calculation,
and bilinear pairing calculation. The multiplication and
exponentiation in the session key calculation are the
same in each protocol and are not compared.
Because the data of Round 1 can be verified by
KGC, the calculation payload of individual participant
of Park’s protocol is minimal. But, in Park’s protocol,
there is an extra public key encryption operation in
Round 2. On the whole, our protocol is the most
efficient.

5

Conclusions

Our proposed protocol takes full advantage of the
data transmitted at various stages of the protocol and
provides both entity authentication and freshness. We
extend authenticators from three neighbors to all nodes
in the group. Our protocol can resist various known
internal impersonation attacks and external attacks. In
our protocol, the global public key can be placed in the
noncyclic group, thus the protocol can be implemented
by supersingular/non-supersingular elliptic curve.
Asymmetric identity based group key agreement
protocols and related security models have been
proposed by some scholars[26, 27] , which are different
from previous methods of session key agreement.
In this type of protocol, participants will negotiate
a common group key, but get a different decryption
key individually. It is a very significant research
direction.
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Table 2 Comparison of the amount of calculation required
by individual participants.
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